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R. v. Comeau: A Crack In the Wall?
Christopher D. Bredt, Ewa Krajewska and Ben Shakinovsky*

I. OVERVIEW
In 2012, one man’s journey from New Brunswick to Quebec in
pursuit of cheap beer sparked a fierce constitutional debate about the role
of interprovincial trade in Canada. In a booze run that has since made
Canadian legal history, Gérard Comeau drove from his home in Tracadie,
New Brunswick to the Listiguj First Nation Indian Reserve in Quebec,
where alcohol is sold at a cheap price. While there, he stocked up on 15
cases of beer and three bottles of liquor, purchased from three different
stores. Unbeknownst to him, Mr. Comeau had been under surveillance in
his sojourn into Quebec. When he crossed back over into New Brunswick,
Mr. Comeau’s vehicle was intercepted by the RCMP, the alcohol was
seized, and Mr. Comeau was charged and fined close to $300 under
section 134(b) of the New Brunswick Liquor Control Act,1 which
prohibits possession of liquor not purchased from the New Brunswick
Liquor Corporation in excess of a prescribed amount.
Rather than pay the fine, Mr. Comeau chose to challenge the law. At
trial, he argued that section 134(b) of the New Brunswick Liquor Control
Act was unenforceable because it constituted a provincial trade barrier in
violation of section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.2 Section 121 of the
Constitution Act, 1867, provides: “All Articles of the Growth, Produce,
or Manufacture of any one of the Provinces shall, from and after the
Union, be admitted free into each of the other Provinces.”3 The Supreme
Court of Canada had previously considered section 121 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 on only a handful of occasions. In those cases, the
*
Christopher D. Bredt is a senior partner at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP and head of the
public law practice group; Ewa Krajewska is a partner at Borden Ladner Gervais LLP and co-chair
of the firm’s appellate advocacy practice; Ben Shakinovsky is an associate at Borden Ladner Gervais
LLP. The Authors would also like to recognize the research memos drafted by Mannu Chowdhury
and Taha Hassan.
1
R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-10.
2
(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5.
3
Id. (emphasis added).
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Supreme Court had adopted a narrow interpretation of section 121,
holding that its scope was limited to a prohibition on customs duties on
the movement of goods between provinces. Mr. Comeau argued that
section 121 was in fact intended to create free trade between the
provinces and that the Supreme Court precedents stating otherwise had
been wrongly decided. To everyone’s surprise, the trial judge agreed with
Mr. Comeau. In an express departure from precedent, the trial judge held
that the authoritative cases on section 121 were wrongly decided and that
section 134(b) violated section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
The quaint set of facts that landed Mr. Comeau in court belie the
case’s constitutional importance. To be sure, it was about more than the
price of beer. As the trial judge in. R. v. Comeau,4 readily acknowledged,
a multitude of provincial laws, policies, and regulatory schemes in
Canada have developed on the assumption that restrictions on
interprovincial trade are permissible.5 Had the trial judge’s decision
stood, a number of provincial regulations concerning wheat, eggs, milk,
poultry, and numerous other goods would have met with similar section
121 challenges. However, the trial judge’s decision did not stand.
Mr. Comeau’s case ended up before the Supreme Court of Canada,
which, as a unanimous nine-bench panel, reversed the trial judge’s
decision and reaffirmed the constitutionality of section 134(b) of the
New Brunswick Liquor Control Act. In so doing, the Supreme Court
circumscribed the scope of section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867,
holding that the purpose of section 121 is not to impose free trade but to
prohibit laws that “in essence and purpose” restrict the passage of goods
across provincial boundaries.6
The Supreme Court’s decision in Comeau highlighted a critical
difference in approach between Canada and other similarly-constituted
jurisdictions towards interstate trade. Other jurisdictions with legal
structures similar to Canada’s have treated burdens on interjurisdictional
trade with appropriate suspicion. In advance of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Comeau, many commentators anticipated that the Court would
treat the case as an overdue opportunity to align Canadian law with the
laws of other federal jurisdictions, and were accordingly disappointed
when it appeared that the Court had declined this opportunity.
4
5
6

SCC”].

[2016] N.B.J. No. 87, 2016 NBPC 3 (N.B. Prov. Ct.) [hereinafter “Comeau NBPC”].
Id., at para. 160.
R. v. Comeau, [2018] S.C.J., No. 15, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 342 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Comeau
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However, a more judicious reading of Comeau suggests that although
the Court did not take full advantage of the opportunity before it, it did
make a subtle change. In Comeau, the Court shifted the section 121
analysis towards a more purpose-driven approach. This new approach,
which impugns any law whose primary purpose is to defeat trade
between the provinces, represents a welcome shift away from a myopic
focus on tariffs and tariff-like barriers towards a stronger guarantee of
free trade within Canada’s borders.
At the same time, the Supreme Court’s decision in Comeau did not go
far enough. While Comeau moved the analysis in the right direction, the
Canadian approach remains unduly narrow when compared to the
interpretation of free trade provisions that prevail in other jurisdictions.
The law surrounding interstate trade in comparable common law
federations, such as the United States of America and Australia, as well
as the European Union, provides a compelling alternative approach to
interstate trade, one that Canadian jurisprudence will hopefully adopt in
coming years.
The following is an outline of this article:
•

The Article begins with an examination of the handful of Supreme
Court and Privy Council decisions that considered section 121 before
Comeau.

•

We then discuss Comeau itself, looking at the judgments rendered by
both the New Brunswick Provincial Court and Supreme Court.

•

Next, we provide an overview of how constitutional and treaty
provisions equivalent to section 121 have been interpreted in the
United States, Australia, and the European Union. This comparative
approach reveals that other federal jurisdictions have adopted a more
purposeful approach towards the free trade provisions of their
constitutions without destroying the integrity of the federation.

•

Finally, in a section entitled, “Towards a New Approach”, this article
examines the treatment of precedent in Comeau and lays out its
argument that other jurisdictions offer a more suitable approach to
interstate trade, both from a legal and policy perspective. We draw
from our comparative law analysis to develop principles that should
guide Canadian jurisprudence in the future.
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II. CASE LAW ON SECTION 121 PRE-COMEAU
The role of judicial precedent is at the heart of the analysis in
Comeau. A brief lesson in the history of the judicial treatment of section
121 is therefore critical to an understanding of Canada’s singular attitude
towards interprovincial trade as compared to other jurisdictions.
Before Comeau, the Supreme Court and Privy Council considered the
ambit of section 121 on four separate occasions. The first of these was
the Supreme Court’s judgment in Gold Seal Ltd. v. Dominion Express
Co.7 In February 1921, the Dominion Express Company refused to ship
the Gold Seal Company’s liquors from Alberta to Saskatchewan or
Manitoba, citing the Canada Temperance Amending Act, which
prohibited the importing of liquor into dry provinces. The law was
challenged on the basis of section 121. The Supreme Court held that the
law did not violate section 121. Justices Duff, Anglin, and Mignault each
adopted a highly circumscribed interpretation of the constitutional
provision, agreeing that its purpose was only “to prohibit the
establishment of customs duties affecting inter-provincial trade in the
products of any province of the Union.”8
Gold Seal exercised a powerful influence on the cases that followed.
In Atlantic Smoke Shops Ltd. v. Conlon,9 the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council endorsed Gold Seal’s gloss on section 121. At issue in
Atlantic Smoke Shops was a piece of New Brunswick legislation that
imposed a tax on tobacco brought in from outside provinces. Adhering to
the Supreme Court’s interpretation in Gold Seal, the Privy Council held
that the legislation did not violate section 121 because it did not impose a
customs duty but rather a general consumption tax.10
In Murphy v. Canadian Pacific Railway,11 the Supreme Court again
had cause to consider the ambit of section 121. In that case, the Canadian
Pacific Railway had refused to ship a grain producer’s grain from
Manitoba to British Columbia, citing prohibitions on interprovincial
transports of grain found in the Canadian Wheat Board Act. Justice
Locke, writing for the majority, unhesitatingly adopted the holding in
Gold Seal and Atlantic Smoke Shops. Justice Rand wrote a concurring
opinion in which he, in the words of the Supreme Court’s decision in
7
8
9
10
11

[1921] S.C.J. No. 43, 62 S.C.R. 424 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gold Seal”].
Id., at 456.
[1943] J.C.J. No. 1, 1943] 4 D.L.R. 81 (U.K. P.C.) [hereinafter “Atlantic Smoke Shops”].
Id., at para. 8.
[1958] S.C.J. No. 48, [1958] S.C.R. 626 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Murphy”].
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Comeau, “undertook a more substantive, purposive analysis of s. 121.”12
Of section 121, Rand J. wrote in concurrence:
I take s. 121, apart from customs duties, to be aimed against trade
regulation which is designed to place fetters upon or raise impediments
to or otherwise restrict or limit the free flow of commerce across the
Dominion as if provincial boundaries did not exist. That it does not
create a level of trade activity divested of all regulation I have no
doubt; what is preserved is a free flow of trade regulated in subsidiary
features which are or have come to be looked upon as incidents of
trade. What is forbidden is a trade regulation that in its essence and
purpose is related to a provincial boundary.13

Finally, section 121 was addressed by the Supreme Court in Reference
re: Agricultural Products Marketing Act, 1970 (Canada).14 The case
dealt with a comprehensive egg marketing scheme under a federal
regulatory statute that involved quotas on interprovincial trade. The
scheme was upheld and the majority at the Court did not address section
121 in its reasons. However, Laskin C.J.C., writing in concurrence, did
engage with section 121. Specifically, he quoted the above passage from
Rand J.’s concurrence in Murphy and adopted its reading of section 121,
including its language of “essence and purpose”. In concurring with
upholding the scheme, Laskin C.J.C. wrote that there is “nothing in the
marketing scheme here that, as a trade regulation, is in its essence and
purpose related to a provincial boundary.”15

III. THE R. V. COMEAU DECISIONS
1. Decision of the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s Bench
At issue in Comeau was section 134(b) of the New Brunswick Liquor
Control Act, which limited the amount of non-Corporation liquor that a
person could possess at any given time. Section 134(b) provides that:
134 Except as provided by this Act or the regulations, no person, within
the Province, by himself, his clerk, employee, servant or agent shall

12
13

R. v. Comeau, [2018] S.C.J. No. 15, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 342, at para. 95 (S.C.C.).
Murphy v. Canadian Pacific Railway, [1958] S.C.J. No. 48, [1958] S.C.R. 626, at 642

(S.C.C.).
14
15

[1978] S.C.J. No. 58, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 (S.C.C.).
Id., at 1268 (emphasis added).

130

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

…
(b) have or keep liquor, not purchased from the Corporation.16

The “simple” issue at trial was whether section 134(b) of the Liquor
Control Act violated section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.17 In a
surprising move, the New Brunswick Provincial Court expressly
departed from the precedent established by the body of Supreme Court
and Privy Council cases outlined above. Specifically, the trial judge held
“with a great deal of trepidation” that Gold Seal was wrongly decided
due to its failure to undertake a large and liberal interpretation of
section 121.18 The string of Supreme Court and Privy Council cases that
followed Gold Seal were decided in Gold Seal’s shadow and were,
according to the trial judge, corrupted by its influence.19
Reviewing the law governing departures from “vertical” precedent
(i.e., instances in which a lower court may depart from otherwise binding
precedent), the trial judge held that the evidence before him at trial
justified such a departure.20 At trial, the defence had presented an
abundance of historical evidence pertaining to the drafting of
the Constitution Act, 1867, as well as its legislative history, scheme, and
context.21 Of particular note was evidence of pronouncements made by
the Fathers of Confederation during the events leading to Confederation,
evidence that, in the trial judge’s opinion, established that “the Fathers of
Confederation wanted free trade as between their respective
jurisdictions.”22 The trial judge held that because this important historical
evidence had not been before the trier-of-fact in any of the previous cases
dealing with section 121, the fact of its presentation in Comeau
constituted a “significant change in evidence” that justified departing
from the precedential jurisprudence on section 121.23
Having found that Gold Seal was wrongly decided and that the
evidence presented at trial allowed for departure from precedent, the trial
judge held that the scope of section 121 was broader than the Supreme
Court had previously construed. Acknowledging that his decision would
have a “resounding impact”, the trial judge held that section 121 allowed
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

R.S.N.B. 1973, c. L-10, s. 134(b).
R. v. Comeau, [2016] N.B.J. No. 87, 2016 NBPC 3, at para. 21 (N.B. Prov. Ct.).
Id., at paras. 116, 189.
Id.
Id., at paras. 117-122, 187.
Id., at para. 125.
Id., at para. 101.
Id., at paras. 125, 188.
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“the free movement of goods among the provinces without barriers, tariff
or non-tariff”.24 The trial judge struck down section 134(b) of the Liquor
Control Act on the basis that it constituted a trade barrier in violation of
section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.25
2. Decision of the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
In a somewhat unusual decision, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
denied the provincial Attorney General’s application for leave to appeal,
citing section 116(3) of the Provincial Offences Procedure Act,26 which
provides that the Attorney General may only appeal to the Court of
Appeal on a ground that involves a question of law alone.27 The
New Brunswick Court of Appeal decision was not longer than a page
with almost no reasoning provided for why leave was denied.
3. Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada
At the Supreme Court, a unanimous nine-bench panel allowed the
Crown’s appeal and restored section 134(b) of the New Brunswick
Liquor Control Act. The Court held, first, that the trial judge had erred in
departing from binding precedent. The “new” evidence presented at
trial — namely, historical evidence of the drafters’ intentions in including
section 121 in the Constitution Act, 1867 and expert evidence that these
intentions ought to inform how the provision is to be interpreted —
merely constituted “a re-discovery or re-assessment of historical
events”.28 This was not evidence of social change such as would justify a
departure from precedent.29 In accepting the testimony of the expert
historian “without hesitation”,30 the trial judge had allowed the
historian’s evidence to supplant precedent and had thereby introduced
“the very instability in the law” that the principle of common law
precedent seeks to avoid.31

24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id., at para. 191.
Id., at para. 193.
S.N.B. 1987, c. P-22.1.
R. v. Comeau, [2016] N.B.J. No. 232, at paras. 2, 3 (N.B.C.A.).
R. v. Comeau, [2018] S.C.J. No. 15, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 342, at para. 36 (S.C.C.).
Id.
Id., at para. 15.
Id., at para. 41.
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On the substantive merits of the appeal, the Court held that the trial
judge erred in his interpretation of section 121. His analysis did not
conform to the purposive approach integral to constitutional analysis in
that it “was limited entirely to the words and context of the provision in
light of the historical evidence.”32 According to the Court, a properly
purposive analysis of section 121 — one that considered the provision in
light of its historical context, its legislative context, and the underlying
principles of the Constitution — supported a narrower reading of
section 121.33
On a historical level, the Court found that section 121 was devised as
a means of achieving economic union in Canada.34 The historical
evidence before the Court suggested that the purpose of section 121 was,
at a minimum, to prohibit the imposition of tariffs and tariff-like
measures on goods crossing provincial borders.35 Lest it seem that the
Court’s conclusions regarding the historical record would support a
broader reading of section 121, the Court was quick to caution that “the
historical evidence nowhere suggests that provinces … would lose their
power to legislate under s. 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867 … even if
that might have impacts on interprovincial trade.”36
The Court found that the provision’s legislative context also militated
against too expansive a reading. The Court noted that section 121 is
situated in Part VIII of the Constitution Act, 1867, entitled
“REVENUES; DEBTS; ASSETS; TAXATION”. The Court deemed this
significant for three reasons:
•

first, because the proximity of section 121 to sections 122 and 123
suggests that the three provisions are to be read as a trio that together
“address the shifting of customs and excise levies from the
provincial to the federal level”;37

•

second, because Part VIII is in general concerned with “direct
burdens on the price of commodities” and therefore does not support
a reading of section 121 that would capture a law’s incidental
impacts on interprovincial trade;38 and
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id., at para. 39.
Id., at paras. 52, 53, 89.
Id., at para. 62.
Id., at para. 67.
Id.
Id., at para. 69.
Id., at para. 71.
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third, because section 121’s position in the scheme of Part VIII
means that it was intended to limit the powers of the legislatures, and
any such limit “must be interpreted in a way that does not deprive
Parliament and provincial legislatures of the powers granted to them
to deal effectively with problems ...”.39

The Court concluded that the legislative context suggests that section
121 should not be interpreted in a way that would sap the provincial or
federal legislatures of their powers, even where those powers incidentally
affect interprovincial trade.40
Finally, the Court noted that the federalism principle, with its
emphasis on jurisdictional balance, would not support full economic
integration, as argued for Mr. Comeau.41 Nor would it support the
Crown’s argument that section 121 ought to be interpreted narrowly so as
to allow governments the power to impose barriers on goods crossing
provincial borders.42 Rather, the federalism principle invited an
interpretation of section 121 that “prohibits laws directed at curtailing the
passage of goods over interprovincial borders, but allows legislatures to
pass laws to achieve other goals within their powers”.43
Consequent upon the analysis, the Court concluded that
s. 121 prohibits laws that in essence and purpose restrict trade across
provincial boundaries. Laws that only have the incidental effect of
restricting trade across provincial boundaries because they are part of
broader schemes not aimed at impeding trade do not offend s. 121 ... .44

This language of essence and purpose derives directly from Rand J.’s
concurrence in Murphy. As with Rand J.’s and Laskin C.J.C.’s respective
concurring opinions in Murphy and Reference Re: Agricultural Products,
the Court in Comeau did not explicitly reject the authority of Gold Seal
in arriving at their conclusion. The Court held that the precedents on
section 121 were not in conflict45 and that Rand J.’s pronouncements in
Murphy simply represented an attempt “to draw out the rationale
underlying Gold Seal” by assuming “a more substantive, purposive

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id., at para. 72.
Id., at paras. 72, 73.
Id., at para. 85.
Id., at para. 87.
Id., at para. 88.
Id., at para. 106.
Id., at para. 91.

134

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

analysis of s. 121.”46 (The Court did, however, acknowledge that Gold
Seal’s treatment of section 121 was not purposive47 and also briefly
entertained the idea that Rand J.’s concurring opinion might have
extended the logic of Gold Seal rather than merely restated it.)48
Elucidating the “essence and purpose” test articulated above, the
Court held that “essence” refers to the law’s nature or character, while
“purpose” refers to the law’s object or “primary purpose”.49 The test is
conjunctive, requiring a claimant to show that the law defeats trade in
both essence and purpose. In order to establish that the essence of a law
restricts trade, a claimant must show that the law distinguishes between
goods in a manner that relates to a provincial boundary.50 To show that
the law in purpose restricts trade, the claimant must demonstrate that the
law’s primary purpose is to defeat trade. This determination will be made
“on the wording of the law, the legislative context in which it was
enacted … and all of the law’s discernible effects”.51
Applying this test to section 134(b) of the Liquor Control Act, the
Court held that the law in essence restricts trade in that it “functions like
a tariff at the extreme end of the spectrum” by imposing fines on those
who stock liquor from outside the Province.52 However, the law’s
primary purpose was not to restrict trade, but rather to create public
oversight over the management and use of alcohol within New
Brunswick.53 The imposition on interprovincial trade created by section
134(b) was a mere incidental effect of the law54 and not enough to render
it unconstitutional under section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

IV. HOW OTHER FEDERATIONS HAVE ADDRESSED
INTERSTATE TRADE
The Canadian approach to interprovincial trade, both as it existed
before Comeau and as it exists now, is somewhat an anomaly when
compared to other federal jurisdictions. Other common law federations,
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Id., at para. 95.
Id., at para. 106.
Id.. at para. 101.
Id., at para. 107.
Id., at para. 108.
Id., at para. 111.
Id., at para. 120.
Id., at para. 124.
Id., at para. 125.
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such as the United States of America and Australia, as well the courts of
the European Union, have assumed a markedly different approach to
equivalent provisions of their constitutions and treaties. All of these
jurisdictions have developed doctrines that target both tariff and certain
non-tariff barriers, particularly where they are discriminatory or
protectionist. A review of the law surrounding interstate trade in each of
these three jurisdictions reveals two trends:
•

where the objective of a measure is protectionism, the measure will
be unconstitutional;

•

if the measure has a valid objective but is protectionist or
discriminatory in its effects on interstate trade, the courts will
analyze whether the measures adopted are appropriately tailored to
the objective of the legislation.

1. The Treatment of Interstate Commerce in the
United States of America
Article I, section 8, clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States of
America provides that: “The Congress shall have power to … regulate
commerce … among the several states”.55 The provision is often referred
to as the “dormant commerce clause”, as it has been interpreted as
having a “negative” or “dormant” aspect that denies states the power to
unjustifiably discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of articles
of commerce. The judicial doctrine that has developed around the
dormant commerce clause is sensitive to the fact that the States do not
have representation in one another’s legislatures, and therefore “lack
recourse to the ordinary legislative means for correcting wrongs” when
the interests of one state are adversely-affected by the legislation of
another. The doctrine ultimately aims to “prevent parochial state
legislation which inevitably stimulates reprisals by other states.”56
The United States Supreme Court has devised a two-part test to
determine whether a restriction on interstate trade violates the dormant
commerce clause. At the first prong, the court will characterize the nature
of the impact on interstate commerce. A court will ask whether the
impugned state law discriminates against interstate commerce, or
55

U.S. Constitution, amend. XVIII, § 1.
Jerome A. Barron and C. Thomas Dienes, Constitutional Law in a Nutshell, 9th ed.
(St. Paul: West Academic Publishing, 2017).
56
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whether the law is neutral on its face but nevertheless burdens interstate
commerce. Any law that is discriminatory in its purpose, or “facially
discriminatory”, falls into the former category. Examples of facially
discriminatory laws include those which “block imports, tax out-of-state
goods but not in-state goods, otherwise give facial preference or have a
purpose or effect of giving preference to in-state resources or goods at
the expense of out-of-state resources or goods”.57 A law falls into the
latter category where it is prima facie neutral but effectively burdens outof-state goods, or creates an “undue burden on interstate commerce”.58
Examples of laws that impose undue burdens include product
requirements, such as rules relating to inspections, labelling, and safety.
For instance, in Dean v. Madison, the Supreme Court struck down a
municipal ordinance stipulating that all milk sold in Madison, Wisconsin
must be pasteurized within five miles of the City limits. The purpose of
the ordinance was to ensure the health and well-being of consumers in
light of the difficulty of regulating the sanitary conditions of milk
produced in remote areas. Although the law had a non-discriminatory
purpose, it was unconstitutional in that it effectively amounted to
“erecting an economic barrier protecting a major local industry against
[out-of-state] competition.” (It was no defence that the ordinance also
applied to milk producers within the State of Wisconsin outside the
five-mile limit.)59
The second prong of the test diverges depending on the law’s
characterization at the first prong. If the law falls into the first category
by facially discriminating against interstate commerce, the court will
apply strict scrutiny to the law and strike it down unless the state can
demonstrate that the law “serves legitimate local purposes that could not
adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.”60 For
instance, in Maine v. Taylor, the Court upheld a Maine law prohibiting
the importation of live baitfish into the State. Although the law
discriminated against interstate commerce, the Court found that the
law served a legitimate public purpose due to uncertainty about the

57

Alexandra Klass and Elizabeth Henley, “Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause” (January 8, 2014), 5 San Diego J. of Climate & Energy L. 127 (2013-2014) Minnesota
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-01; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 14-01. Available
online at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2376411> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2376411>, at 130.
58
Dean v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, at 353 (1951).
59
Id., at 354.
60
477 U.S. 131, at 151 (1986) [hereinafter “Maine”].
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ecological effect on the local wild fish population by the possible
presence of non-native species.61
Conversely, if the law falls into the second category and burdens
interstate commerce despite its facial neutrality, American courts will
apply the less rigorous “Pike balancing test”. The test was articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.:62
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
… If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will, of
course, depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.63

There are effectively three considerations under the Pike balancing
test: (1) whether the state law has a legitimate local purpose; (2) the
nature of the state interest involved (its “degree”); and (3) whether the
legitimate state interest could be served through measures which have a
lesser impact on interstate commerce. For instance, in Pike, the Court
struck down an order that prohibited an Arizonan producer of highquality cantaloupes from shipping the fruit outside of Arizona unless the
Company packed the fruit in specific containers that marked the fruit as
being of Arizonan origin (the Company had previously been transporting
the fruit to a Californian packing facility, where the fruit would be
packed and shipped out bearing the name of the California packer). The
order could not withstand scrutiny under the Pike balancing test. While
the order had a “clearly legitimate” purpose in ensuring the State’s
interest that the high-quality produce be accurately marked as being of
Arizonan origin, this interest was “tenuous” compared to the
“significant” burden the packing requirements placed on the Company.64
The crux of the analysis under the dormant commerce clause is
categorizing the law as one that discriminates in its purpose or in its
effect. Laws that purposefully impede trade will be strictly scrutinized
and likely struck down. But even where a law serves a legitimate local
61
62
63
64

Id.
397 U.S. 137 (1970) [hereinafter “Pike”].
Id., at 142.
Id., at 145.
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purpose, a court will inquire about the “degree” of the purpose and
whether the same interest could be served through less restrictive means.
The court will strike down a state law when the burden it imposes is
“clearly excessive” as against the local benefit it generates.65
2. The Treatment of Free Trade in Australia
Section 92 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia
provides: “On the imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade,
commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of
internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free.”66 The
High Court of Australia has held that the provision is designed to foster a
common market67 and “to prevent the use of State and Territory
boundaries as trade borders or barriers for the protection of participants
in the market who are within a State or Territory, from competition from
participations in that same market, who are not in that State or
Territory.”68
Two distinct legal tests have historically governed the interpretation
of section 92. Until 1988, the High Court of Australia applied a legal test
known as the “criterion of option” test, which generally resulted in
upholding laws that only incidentally restricted interstate trade and
striking down laws that in “essence” hindered interstate trade.69
However, distinguishing the “essence” of legislation from its incidental
features proved cumbersome and difficult.70 Consequently, in 1988, in
Cole,71 the High Court rejected the criterion of application test and
replaced it with a new test that continues to govern the application of
65

Id., at 142.
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act [Australia], July 9, 1900. The remainder of
s. 92 states:
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section 92 today. The test inquires whether the law imposes
“discriminatory burdens of a protectionist kind” on out-of-state
businesses.72
The inquiry is divided into four stages.73 Under the first prong of the
test, the Court will ask whether the impugned law imposes a legislative
burden on interstate trade.74 This element of the test is satisfied when the
claimant can demonstrate that the State law (1) adversely affects one’s
commercial interests; and (2) prima facie favours products from the State
from which the law originates over products from another State.75
Examples of legislative burdens include prohibitions against
nationalizing banks,76 restrictions on a national barley scheme,77 and
licensing and production quotas on margarine.78
Australian courts treat the second and third prongs of the test
concurrently.79 The second prong is concerned with whether the
regulation discriminates between local and out-of-state business, either in
its language or in its effects. If the law is found to be discriminatory,
courts will proceed to the third prong and ask whether the discrimination
is “protectionist” in character. Concerning discrimination and
protectionism, the High Court stated in Cole:
…to construe s 92 as requiring that interstate trade and commerce be
immune only from discriminatory burdens of a protectionist kind does
not involve inconsistency with the words ‘absolutely free’: it is simply
to identify the kinds or classes of burdens, restrictions, controls and
standards from which the section guarantees absolute freedom.80
72
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Discrimination has been defined as “the departure from equality of
treatment.”81 Laws that grant local business an unfair competitive edge
over out-of-state business are considered discriminatory in the context of
section 92.82 The inquiry is concerned with the actual effects of the law83
and recognizes that discrimination “can occur on the face of the law or
may result from the factual operation of the law.”84 In determining
whether a law is discriminatory, the High Court has applied an objective
standard and asked what a reasonable person would think.85 However, in
determining whether a law is protectionist, the High Court has employed
both a subjective approach and an objective approach. For instance, in
Castlemaine Tooheys Ltd. v. South Australia,86 the Court probed whether
the State’s express purpose in enacting refillable bottle regulations was to
deter out-of-state brewers;87 in so doing, the Court implicitly emphasized
the subjective intention of the Legislature. However, in Cole, the Court
focused only on the objective effects of certain crayfish regulations on
free trade and did not look to the animating purpose behind the
regulations.88
If the law is found to be discriminatory and protectionist, the Court
will at the fourth prong of the test ask whether the law is “reasonably
necessary” to achieve a legitimate objective. This final stage of the test
introduces a proportionality analysis into the overall inquiry. Factors to
be weighed by courts under the proportionality analysis may include
whether the burden imposed by the law is incidental, whether the burden
is proportionate to the achievement of the legitimate objective, and
whether the presence of other “reasonable non-discriminatory alternative
means of securing the legitimate object suggests that the purpose of the
law is to effect a prohibited discrimination.”89
81
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The test articulated in Cole admittedly has certain weaknesses. The
concurrent treatment of the second and third prongs of the test has
resulted in conceptual uncertainty, making it difficult to delineate
between discrimination at the second prong and protectionism at the third
prong. The proportionality component of the test also lacks sufficient
clarity. Unlike proportionality-based tests in Canada like the Oakes test,90
Australian courts have not developed a set of formal factors or criteria to
guide the proportionality analysis nor have they precisely defined the
“reasonably necessary” standard that governs the proportionality
analysis.91 This, along with the fact that the High Court has variously
employed both a subjective and an objective approach at the third prong,
means that the Cole test can yield any number of outcomes. But although
this differentiated approach towards a law’s protectionist character
creates a degree of unpredictability, certain state actions will almost
invariably be deemed protectionist. Such actions include: tariffs that
increase the price of imports, quotas on imports, differential railway
rates, and subsidies for local goods.92
3. The Treatment of Free Trade Among the Member States of the
European Union
The European Union’s primary treaty governing free trade is the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU, also known the
Lisbon Treaty). Of particular importance for free trade purposes are
Articles 30, 34, 35, and 36 of TFEU. Article 30 imposes an absolute
prohibition on customs duties on imports and exports between Member
States.93 Articles 34 and 35 address non-tariff-based barriers and provide
that quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and “all measures
having equivalent effect shall be prohibited between Member States.”94
Article 36 provides that Articles 34 and 35 “shall not preclude
prohibitions or restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit that are
justified on certain grounds, including public morality, public policy or
90
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public security, the protection of health and life of humans, animals or
plants, the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial or commercial property.”
However, Article 36 goes on to provide that such prohibitions cannot
“constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction
on trade between Member States.”95
Articles 30, 34, and 35, which promote free trade among EU Member
States, have been liberally interpreted by the European Courts. In
Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville,96 the European
Court broadly interpreted the phrase “measures having equivalent
effect”, to mean “all trading rules enacted by Member States which are
capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intracommunity trade”.97 By contrast, the enumerated exceptions under
Article 36 have been narrowly interpreted. The exceptions listed under
Article 36 are exhaustive and limited to non-economic objectives.98
The European Court has recognized some limits on the interpretation
of Articles 34 and 35. The Court has held that Articles 34 and 35
specifically target state intervention in intra-community trade and do not
impose restrictions on agreements that arise from private contracts,
individuals, or companies.99 Furthermore, national provisions that restrict
or prohibit certain selling arrangements do not come within the reach of
Articles 34 and 35 so long as the provisions “apply to all relevant traders
operating within the national territory and so long as they [equally]
affect…the marketing of [both] domestic and [imported] products”.100 In
other words, national prohibitions and restrictions that apply equally to
all Member States do not violate Articles 34 and 35. Also regarding
limitations to Articles 34 and 35, the European Court held in Cassis de
Dijon,101 that national rules concerning imported products can be
maintained provided they are “necessary in order to satisfy mandatory
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial
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transactions and the defence of the consumer.”102 The exceptions outlined
in Cassis de Dijon are referred to variously as “mandatory requirements”
and “public interest requirements”.103
The legal test that has emerged from the jurisprudence of the
European Court adheres to a two-pronged analysis.104 At the first prong,
the Court must determine whether the national measure “impedes”,
“hinders” or creates an “obstacle” to interstate trade (which is to ask,
does the law breach Article 34 or 35?). As stated above, courts will
interpret Articles 34 and 35 liberally and the prohibition in Articles 34
and 35 on “measures having equivalent effect” includes measures that
impede trade “directly or indirectly, actually or potentially”.105
If an infringement of Article 34 or 35 is established, the Court will
proceed to the second stage of the analysis and ask whether the measure
(1) is permitted under Article 36 of the Treaty; or (2) genuinely serves
the intended purpose and is proportional to the objective sought. As
discussed above, the “mandatory requirements” or “public interest
requirements” outlined in Cassis de Dijon can justify an infringement of
Article 34 or 35. Unlike the exceptions listed under Article 36, these
justifications are non-exhaustive.106
If the Member State establishes that the law genuinely serves the
intended public interest purpose, the Court will assess the law against the
criteria of a proportionality analysis. The first step of the proportionality
analysis has been referred to as the “test of suitability”107 and requires
that a Member State show a “reasonable connection between the
requirements laid down by the authorities and the exercise of control.”108
Other cases have characterized this step as a matter of ensuring that the
“measure is appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective
pursued”.109 The next two steps of the analysis are conducted
concurrently and are together referred to as the “test of necessity”. Under
102

Id., at para. 8.
Id.
104
Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 5th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), at 102.
105
Procureur du Roi v. Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, Case 8/74, at para. 5 (E.C.).
106
Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU: The Four Freedoms, 5th ed. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), at 173-74.
107
Id., at 179.
108
NV United Foods and PVBA Aug. Van den Abeele v Belgian State, Case 132/80,
at para. 28 (E.C.).
109
Commission of the European Communities v. Portuguese Republic, Case C-265/06,
at para. 37 (E.C. (Third Chamber)).
103

144

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

the test of necessity, the Court will ask whether the desired objective
could be achieved through less restrictive means and whether the chosen
means nevertheless have an excessive effect on traders’ interests.110
A helpful illustration of the application of the European framework
involved a Portuguese prohibition on the affixing of tinted screens on car
windows. The European Court held that the prohibition violated Article
34 because it restricted the marketing of almost all tinted film legally
manufactured and sold in other Member States.111 Portugal attempted to
justify the prohibition on the grounds of fighting crime and ensuring road
safety, as the prohibition enabled easy and immediate inspection of the
interior of a person’s car (for the purpose of ensuring seat-belt use,
identifying suspects etc.). The Court accepted that the prohibition “does
indeed appear to be likely to facilitate such inspection and, therefore,
appropriate to attain the objectives of fighting crime and ensuring road
safety”.112 However, the prohibition failed at the “less restrictive means”
stage of the proportionality analysis. The Court held that the ability to
immediately inspect a car’s interior was only one of several means
available to authorities to fight crime and ensure proper seat-belt use.
Furthermore, the existence of a wide variety of tinted film, ranging from
transparent to nearly opaque, rendered the categorical prohibition on all
tinted film “excessive and, therefore, disproportionate with respect to the
objectives pursued.”113 In addition, the Court found that Portugal’s
rationale was undermined by the fact that Portugal itself allowed
manufacturers to sell cars with pre-tinted windows.114

V. TOWARDS A NEW APPROACH
This section begins with an examination of the Supreme Court’s shift
towards a purpose-driven approach in the Comeau decision. Second, we
discuss how the Supreme Court approached overturning precedent.
Finally, this section looks at the common principles that govern the
approach towards interstate trade in other jurisdictions, arguing that these
principles together create a compelling framework that ought to be
110
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incorporated into the law of interprovincial trade in Canada. This
framework would not support a libertarian interpretation of section 121
that bars all forms of restriction on trade. Instead, it would promote free
trade between the provinces while still allowing the federal government
to regulate trade at the national level. To be sure, a considerable amount
of provincial legislation would be overturned as a result. However, doing
away with provincial barriers to trade is a necessary consequence of
creating a strong common market in Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada rendered its judgment in Comeau on
April 19, 2018. The decision was not particularly well received in the
public sphere, as reflected by the largely critical treatment it received at
the hands of the Canadian news media. Andrew Coyne, writing in the
National Post, inveighed against the decision, arguing that it “will do the
country serious harm” by saddling the country with “hundreds of existing
provincial barriers to trade indefinitely” and giving provinces “the green
light to put up more.”115 Howard Anglin wrote with equal derision in The
Globe and Mail that the “commitment [of provincial liquor corporations]
to limiting customer choice and dedication to preserving a Soviet-style
shopping experience has survived the grim threat of a retiree looking to
save a few bucks.”116 These criticisms are arguably valid: the decision
was not sufficiently sensitive to the political backdrop of a global
economy where trade between countries is becoming increasingly freer.
1. The Move Towards a Purpose-Driven Approach
At the same time, these criticisms ignore at least one crucial aspect of
Comeau — namely, that the Supreme Court’s decision does not present
as a straightforward endorsement of the earlier jurisprudence on
section 121. The Court did, for instance, acknowledge that “... Gold Seal
did not undertake a purposive analysis of s. 121”.117 Indeed, the decision
does not consist merely of a restatement of Gold Seal’s ratio that
section 121 prohibits tariffs alone. Rather, the Court adopted the
interpretation of section 121 expressed first by Rand J. in concurrence in
115
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Murphy and later by Laskin C.J.C. also in Reference re: Agricultural
Products: the prohibitions imposed by section 121 extend not only to
laws that impose tariffs but to laws that in essence and purpose aim to
defeat the passage of goods across provincial boundaries.
The Court’s adoption of this interpretation of section 121 in Comeau
effectively shifted the framework of the analysis away from a formalistic
inquiry about tariff-imposing restraints and towards a more complex and
subtle purpose-based approach. Admittedly, the Court denied that the
adoption of this approach entailed a departure from the Gold Seal
precedent. The Court held that Gold Seal and the cases that followed it are
consistent with Rand J.’s “basic proposition”.118 However, this declaration
is arguably belied by the Court’s acknowledgment that Rand J.’s analysis
in Murphy might extend, rather than simply restate, the logical
underpinning of Gold Seal.119 The Court further acknowledged that all
previous jurisprudential affirmations of a purpose-driven approach to
section 121 were made either “without majoritarian status or in obiter”,
meaning that this approach did not have the pedigree of binding precedent
before Comeau.120 At very least, the Court’s decision in Comeau brought
clarity to the law, moving it towards an analysis that requires looking
beyond a law’s superficial features to discern its actual purpose.
2. The Treatment of Precedent
The Court’s adoption of a purpose-driven inquiry meant pushing the
Gold Seal line of authority to the periphery, if not banishing it altogether.
There is some irony to the Court’s doing so, given how highly critical the
Court was of the trial judge for making a similar (albeit bolder) move in
the Comeau trial decision. As detailed above, the Court’s disapprobation
stemmed from its holding that the historical evidence relied on by the
trial judge was not sufficient evidence of profound social change such as
would justify a departure from vertical precedent.121 And yet, the Court
in this case similarly moved away from the precedent of Gold Seal,

118
119
120
121

Id., at para. 101.
Id.
Id., at para. 105.
Id., at para. 36.

(2020) 94 S.C.L.R. (2d)

R. v. Comeau

147

without so much as reviewing the legal principles that would justify a
departure from horizontal stare decisis.122
Furthermore, the Supreme Court grounded its departure from Gold
Seal partly in the same historical evidence introduced and relied upon by
the trial judge. The Supreme Court cited the speeches given by political
leaders at the time of Confederation123 in support of its holding that “the
historical context supports the view that, at a minimum, s. 121 prohibits
the imposition of charges on goods crossing provincial boundaries —
tariffs and tariff-like measures.”124 In other words, the Court relied on the
new historical evidence cited by the trial judge to guide its reasoning and
ultimately arrive at a conclusion distinct from the majority’s holding in
previous section 121 cases. This aspect of the decision fits awkwardly
with the Court’s holding that the trial judge erred in doing the same.
3. Common Principles from the Law of Interstate Trade in Other
Jurisdictions
Other concerns arise from the Supreme Court’s decision. For instance,
the Court’s holding that a law will fail only if its primary purpose is to
impede trade has the disturbing potential to allow almost any
protectionist measure to pass constitutional muster provided that the law
has an ostensible intra-provincial purpose. Simply put, Comeau did not
go far enough. The example offered by other jurisdictions, detailed
above, presents a preferable model for dealing with protectionist
measures that attempt to thwart interstate trade. A review of the legal
framework of these three jurisdictions reveals the following common
principles that could be constructively integrated into the Canadian
approach.
(a) All Other Jurisdictions Review Both Direct and Indirect
Restrictions on Interprovincial Trade
Reviewing a law’s direct and indirect restrictions means looking not
only at its purpose but also at its effects. In the American jurisprudence,
122
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the difference between direct and indirect restrictions is treated as a
distinction that attracts different degrees of scrutiny. This delineation
means that courts will apply different tests depending on this initial
characterization of the law. Where a law directly limits state trade, or is
facially discriminatory, courts will strictly scrutinize it through the
“legitimate local purpose” test;125 where a law indirectly limits interstate
trade, or is neutral on its face, courts will scrutinize it less strictly
through the Pike balancing test.126 No laws that impose potential
restrictions on trade, whether direct or indirect, are given an automatic
pass. Through separate analytical frameworks, both categories of law are
subject to review.
The Australian and European models do not even draw a conceptual
distinction between direct and indirect impositions on trade. While
Australian courts have recognized that discrimination in trade may
“occur on the face of the law” (i.e., directly) or may “result from the
factual operation of the law” (i.e., indirectly),127 they tend to collapse this
distinction by focusing on the actual effects of the law.128 The law of the
European Union similarly blurs the distinction by emphasizing the law’s
effect over its purpose. As stated above, the European Court has
interpreted Articles 34 and 35 of TFEU liberally, with the result that the
phrase “measures having equivalent effect” applies to measures that
impede trade “directly or indirectly, actually or potentially.”129
By contrast, the Canadian jurisprudence has little to say regarding
laws that indirectly restrict trade. Comeau does not offer a separate
analytic framework to account for the distinction between direct and
indirect restrictions, as the American courts do. Nor does Comeau
purport to collapse the distinction and treat the two with equal scrutiny,
as the Australian and European courts do. The Supreme Court of
Canada’s focus in Comeau on the purpose and essence of the law leaves
little room for considering that law’s effects, particularly where the law is
ostensibly neutral but indirectly affects trade. Furthermore, where the
125
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Court does address the questions of effect over purpose, the analysis is
largely limited to a discussion of “incidental effects”, which fall outside
the ambit of section 121.130 The Court’s failure to account for the
difference in these two categories of laws, either by developing different
analytic frameworks or by shifting the focus of the analysis to the law’s
effects, results in a conceptual shortcoming that is specifically addressed
in other comparable jurisdictions.
(b) Direct Purposeful Restrictions on Interstate Trade are Difficult to
Justify, Particularly Where They Directly Discriminate Against
Out-of-State Interests
This proposition is applied with little controversy in the laws of other
jurisdictions. In Australia, laws that take the form of state actions,
including quotas on imports and subsidies for local goods, will almost
invariably be deemed “protectionist” under the four-part test developed
in Cole.131 In the United States, a direct and purposeful limitation on
trade will attract strict scrutiny and is likely to be struck down unless the
State can demonstrate that the law “serves legitimate local purposes that
could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory
alternatives.”132
The same is not true in Canada. The strength of the Supreme Court’s
purpose-based analysis in Comeau is tempered by the Court’s
qualification that “purpose” in fact means “primary purpose”. That is to
say, it is not enough to show that one of the law’s purposes is to defeat
trade; section 121 is only engaged when it can be shown that the law’s
primary purpose is to defeat trade.133 The fact that a Canadian law has a
tariff-like purpose will not attract stricter scrutiny or a presumption of
protectionism. At very most, the fact that a law has such a purpose can be
deployed as evidence that the law’s primary purpose is to defeat trade.134
It is to be hoped that as the law on interprovincial trade in Canada
continues to develop, it will increasingly conform to the example set by
other similarly-constituted jurisdictions. Any law aimed at the defeat of
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interprovincial trade should be difficult to justify under section 121,
irrespective of whatever other purposes that law may have.
(c) All Other Jurisdictions Apply Some Form of a Proportionality Test
in Determining Whether the Restrictions on Interstate Trade are
Unconstitutional
In the cases of all other jurisdictions under consideration, a
proportionality analysis is integrated into the larger inquiry as to whether
the law is constitutional. In the United States jurisprudence, once a law
has been deemed neutral on its face, the court will analyze the law
against the criteria of the Pike balancing test, which consists of weighing
the local public interest protected by the law against the burdens on
interstate commerce imposed by the law. Even where a legitimate local
purpose is found, the Court will inquire into the nature of the local
interest and into whether the local interest could be promoted through
less restrictive means.135 Similarly in Australia, once a court has
established that a law is both discriminatory and protectionist, it will
move to the final prong of the section 92 analysis and ask whether the
law in question is “reasonably necessary” to achieve a legitimate
objective.136 Likewise, in the law of the European Union, a Member State
must show that a breach of Article 34 or 35 is proportionate, even once
the Member State has established that the law serves a genuine public
interest. This means inquiring as to whether there is a reasonable
connection between the justification for the law and the law itself,
whether the law’s objective could be achieved through less restrictive
means, and, even if so, whether the means employed by the law
nevertheless have an excessive effect on traders’ interests.137
Discussion of proportionality is conspicuously absent from Comeau.
The point at which other jurisdictions might embark on a proportionality
analysis is exactly the point that Canadian courts will stop the analysis
and affirm the law as constitutional. The analysis in Comeau begins and
ends with an inquiry into purpose. Rather than stop the analysis at
the determination of purpose, Canadian jurisprudence ought to follow the
example of other jurisdictions and craft an analysis that looks also at the
135
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relationship between the law and its stated purpose, at whether the local
interest served by the law could be promoted through less impairing
means, and at whether the nature and extent of interference is justifiable
or excessive. The Supreme Court of Canada is a known champion of
proportionality and balancing tests of exactly this type, particularly in the
constitutional context. Without a meaningful examination of the interests
at stake and an attempt to balance those interests, the “essence and
purpose” analysis ends before the inquiry is truly complete.

VI. CONCLUSION
Amidst the conceptual incoherence of the pre-Comeau Canadian
jurisprudence, it was unclear if section 121 would be consigned to the
limited task of enforcing restrictions on interprovincial tariffs. In this
respect, the Supreme Court’s decision in Comeau brought relief and
clarity to the law, affirming that section 121 had enough potency to
prohibit laws that in purpose or essence impeded interprovincial trade.
The crystallization of the “purpose and essence” test in Comeau brought
the Canadian jurisprudential approach into closer alignment with other
jurisdictions. However, a more robust and incisive approach is still
needed. While the Supreme Court may well have been correct in holding
in Comeau that “... Section 121 does not impose absolute free trade
across Canada”,138 the Court would have done well to look to the
alternatives articulated in the jurisprudence of the United States,
Australia, and the European Union. The approach favoured in these
jurisdictions is compelling not only from a legal standpoint but also from
a policy standpoint. These jurisdictions have recognized that there are
strong public policy reasons that favour the development of a robust
national common market, including eliminating interstate trade battles
and ensuring that the parochial interests of state legislation do not prevail
over the broader national or federal interest in a common market.
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